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1. Introduction 
 Transfer pricing and tax havens, individually and in combination, adversely affect 
the ability of many countries to raise tax revenues.  The problem is especially severe in 
less developed countries (LDCs) and in countries in transition from socialism (CITs), 
which I will generally lump together and designate as LDCTs.1  This paper describes 
some of the revenue implications of transfer pricing and tax havens and examines, 
somewhat speculatively, the possibility of mending the tears in the revenue nets of 
LDCTs.2 
                                                 
* Hoover Institution, Stanford University 
1Kudrle and Eden (2003, p. 50) opine, “... the tax evasion damage to poor countries is almost certainly 
greater than to richer states.” 
2The title refers only to LDCs because making it more accurate would make it long and ungainly.  Where 
meaning is clear from context, the term “transfer pricing” is sometimes used as a shorthand for 
“manipulation of transfer prices.”  Of course, transfer prices for transactions between related parties are 
essential, whether they are manipulated or not. 
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 Revenue losses result primarily from avoidance of corporate income taxes and 
evasion of individual income taxes.  LDCTs are more limited than developing countries 
in what they can do to mend their revenue nets, inter alia because of the complexity of 
the problem and the lack of administrative resources.  They may thus be reliant on 
developed countries to assist them, either because they choose to do so or as the result of 
measures they take to protect their own tax bases.3  The paper examines whether the 
recent OECD initiative to combat harmful tax competition may indirectly benefit LDCTs. 
 The next section provides a bare-bones description of the international tax 
“system.”  The section that follows it discuss the revenue implications of tax havens and 
transfer pricing.  Sections IV and V, respectively, examine two ways to prevent abuse, 
monitoring transfer pricing and enforcing anti-deferral legislation.  Section VI examines 
the OECD initiatives on harmful tax competition and related matters.  Section VII 
concludes. 
 The paper deals primarily with the use of transfer pricing and tax havens by 
multinational businesses to defer, avoid, or (depending on whether one views 
manipulation of transfer prices as involving avoidance or evasion) evade taxes levied by 
the country of residence.  Thus it pays relatively little attention to the use of tax havens 
by wealthy individuals to evade taxes in their countries of residence.  Nor does it consider 
preferential tax treatment for selected non-financial sectors, perhaps limited to foreign 
investors, in order to attract real (non-financial) activities.  Such countries are not 
ordinarily called tax havens,4 and these policies are best covered by a paper on tax 
incentives.5  Finally, it does not consider headquarters havens, except in passing, in the 
brief discussion of corporate inversions. 
                                                 
3Kudrle and Eden (2003, p. 66) note, “By any relative measure, most low-income 
 countries are hurt more by capital flight and untaxed foreign earnings than are OECD states. Moreover, 
there is nothing they can effectively do individually or as a group to stanch the outflow. Because most of 
the capital flow from poorer countries is invested in OECD states, the rich hold the key to taxation reform.” 
4Avi-Yonah (2000) calls such countries production havens.  Countries that levy generally applicable income 
taxes at low  rates are usually not classified as tax havens.  Kudrle and Eden (2003, p. 40) make the useful 
distinction between activities that take place in a tax haven, activities that are assigned to a haven, and the 
use of havens to mask reality.  They distinguish further (p. 41) between production havens, headquarters 
havens, sham havens, and secrecy havens.  This paper is concerned primarily with the use of havens to shift 
income and, to a lesser extent, with the use of secrecy to mask reality for wealthy investors. 
5See, however, the papers in Shah (1995), Holland and Vann (1998), McLure (1999), and Easson (2001a, 
b) and references provided therein. 
Transfer Pricing and Tax Havens: 
Mending the LDC Revenue Net 
 
 
3
 It will be useful to consider three broad classes of countries: tax havens, 
developed countries, and (non-haven) LDCTs,.6  For some purposes it will be useful to 
distinguish between the least developed LDCs and more advanced LDCTs.  Since the 
paper is most concerned with the fiscal plight of LDCTs, it considers the situation of 
developed countries primarily as models for what LDCTs might do and to understand the 
possibility that assistance for LDCTs will be forthcoming, perhaps as a collateral benefit 
of policies developed countries adopt for their own reasons. 
 It may be useful to indicate some of the other topics the paper does not cover.  
First, it does not discuss whether or not having a corporate income tax is a good idea for a 
small open economy.  Similarly, it does not discuss the related question of whether or not 
it is a good idea for an individual country to levy such a tax at a rate above zero on 
income foreigners earn in the country.  Second, it does not discuss whether taxation 
should be designed to further capital export neutrality or capital import neutrality.7  Thus, 
it does not enter into the current US debate over whether or not to either end deferral or 
move to a more territorial system.  Third, it does not consider whether or how the basic 
rules that govern taxation of international flows of income, contained in model treaties 
(for example, the definition of a permanent establishment), should be changed to 
accommodate the development of electronic-commerce (e-commerce), which accentuates 
problems of transfer pricing.8  Fourth, it does not consider whether formula 
                                                 
6These categories, though useful, are not necessarily exclusive.  For example, Switzerland and the United 
States, both developed countries, act as tax havens for passive investments.  For an indictment of the 
United States as a tax haven under the criteria of the OECD report on harmful tax competition (OECD, 
1998), see Langer (2000). 
7See, however, Graetz (2001) and references provided there.  If all countries levied only source-based 
taxes, all income earned in a given jurisdiction would be subject to the same tax regime, and capital import 
neutrality would prevail.  By comparison, if all levied only residence-based taxes (or if those that levied 
residence-based taxes granted credits for all foreign income taxes) and there were no deferral, all income 
earned by those residing in a given jurisdiction would be subject to the same tax regime, and capital export 
neutrality would prevail.  Because of deferral and limitations on the foreign tax credit, complete capital 
export neutrality is not achieved, even for residents of countries that tax worldwide income. 
8Electronic commerce complicates application of the international system in two ways.  First, it brings into 
question many of the basic concepts underlying that system, including the determination of corporate 
residence, distinctions between types of income (e.g., income from sale of a product, income from 
provision of a service, and royalties), the nature of a permanent establishment, the source of business 
income, and the application of transfer pricing guidelines.  Many of these developments appear to have 
negative implications for LDCTs.  As important as these are, they are not discussed her.  See, however, IFA 
(2000a) and McLure (2003b) and references given there.Second, e-commerce aggravates the problems of 
transfer pricing and tax havens described below.   There are – and increasingly will be – more transactions 
between related entities, many of them in intangibles for which there are no comparable uncontrolled 
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apportionment should replace separate accounting and the arm’s length standard as a way 
to solve the problems identified here related to corporate use of tax havens and transfer 
prices.  (On this, see McLure, 2002, and literature cited there.)  Fifth, the tax implications 
of derivatives and other modern financial instruments are not considered, despite their 
role in greatly complicating efforts to deal with tax havens and other abuses.  Finally, it 
does not consider whether a World Tax Organization, which has been proposed, inter 
alia, by Tanzi (1999) and the Zedillo Commission (UN, 2001), is needed to address the 
problems described here. 
 
2. The International Tax “System” 
 In principle, all income that crosses international borders could be taxed by the 
country where it originates (the source country) or by the country of residence of the 
recipients of the income (also sometimes called the home country).9  If both countries 
were to tax such income, double taxation would occur.  Both domestic laws and bilateral 
tax treaties, especially among developed countries, contain provisions intended to prevent 
this, and treaties also provide for exchange of information between the tax administrators 
of source and residence countries.  Most treaties between developed countries, as well as 
some between developed countries and LDCTs, are based on the OECD Model Treaty.  
Treaties between LDCs are more likely to follow the UN Model Treaty, which is 
generally more favorable to source countries. 
 Under these treaties income is taxed differently, depending on how it is 
characterized.  Source countries ordinarily tax net business income (that is, income net of 
deductions for expenses of earning the income), but only if it is earned by a “permanent 
establishment” (PE) in the country.  By comparison, source countries tax interest, 
dividends, and royalties, if at all, on a gross basis (that is, with no deductions for 
expenses of earning the income), commonly via withholding taxes.  These taxes are 
generally reduced, sometimes to zero, under treaties.  It may thus be necessary for source 
                                                                                                                                                 
transactions.  Financial transactions and communications – the very lifeblood of tax havens – will be easier 
and faster.  Residence for tax purpose will be more footloose and more difficult to determine.  It will thus 
be easier to locate it in tax havens.  Some real activities will also be easier to locate in tax havens. 
9Arnold (1986) provides an excellent description of this system.  For a description of the economic 
incentives created by the US version of the international system, including some anti-abuse rules, see 
Scholes et al. (2002). 
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countries to determine a) whether income is business income or some other kind of 
income, b) whether or not business income is earned by a PE, c) the geographic source of 
the income, and d) the amount of income that is taxable.  It is also necessary for countries 
taxing worldwide income to determine the geographic source and amount of income, in 
order to calculate the limits on foreign tax credits mentioned below. 
 Residence countries generally either exempt foreign-source income or tax it as 
part of the taxpayer’s worldwide income and allow credits for tax paid to source 
countries, up to the amount of domestic tax on the income.10  Countries such as France 
that tax business income on the basis of source may, none-the-less tax passive income of 
their residents.  Subject to limitations to be described in Section IV below, residence 
countries respect the legal identity of separate corporations; this implies that residence 
country tax on foreign-source income earned by foreign subsidiaries (but not by foreign 
branches) is “deferred” until it is repatriated. 
 In what follows we examine how transfer pricing and tax havens produce tears in 
this system and whether and how the tears can be mended..  Wealthy individuals in both 
LDCTs and developed countries employ tax havens to evade taxes on passive 
investments.  By comparison, the tears in the corporate revenue net that LDCTs and 
developed countries experience are not the same.  In the former case, the primary risk is 
to source-based taxation, that is, taxation of corporate income having its source within the 
country.  By comparison, developed countries are also likely be concerned about 
residence-based taxation of corporate income.  An important focus of the paper is to 
discern whether actions taken be developed countries to protect their tax bases can also, if 
indirectly, help protect those of developed countries. 
 
3. Tears in the System 
 Tax havens and transfer pricing create tears in the revenue system.  To simplify 
exposition, we initially discuss the use of tax havens simply to defer, avoid, and evade 
taxes, while ignoring manipulation of transfer prices.  We then consider the effects of 
                                                 
10Most countries define residence in terms of the place of effective management.  By comparison, the 
United States uses only the place of incorporation.  This distinction is generally ignored here.  See, 
however, the brief reference to corporate inversions in Section IV.B. 
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manipulating transfer prices, in the absence of tax havens.  Finally, we consider the 
realistic case in which tax havens and manipulation of transfer prices occur together.  We 
abstract initially from the effects of legislation and administrative techniques intended to 
prevent tax minimization associated with transfer pricing and tax havens, which are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
A. Deferral, Tax Avoidance, and Evasion in “Simple” Tax Haven Cases 
 Tax havens may arise for several reasons that do not involve manipulation of 
transfer prices.  These generally, but not always, involve wealthy individuals or corporate 
parents that are residents of a country that taxes worldwide income (at a rate that exceeds 
that in the source country), rather than exempting foreign-source income.  It is 
worthwhile to describe two cases that will help understand the purpose of anti-deferral 
legislation. 
 1. Passive investment 
 First, a corporation may use a tax haven subsidiary (or a trust) to make passive 
investments, thereby postponing home-country tax that the parent would owe if it 
received the income currently.  In the absence of anti-abuse legislation, income from 
investments made in the residence country of the parent might be channeled to the tax 
haven, thereby allowing the parent to achieve deferral of tax on domestic-source 
income.11  It may also be possible to convert ordinary income from passive investments 
into capital gains by selling shares in the tax haven subsidiary, rather than receiving 
dividends from it, thereby realizing the benefits of reduced tax rates. 
 Wealthy individuals may also engage in this type of tax haven activity, but they 
are more likely never to pay tax, thus evading it, rather than merely deferring it.  The 
success of tax evasion in this case depends on confidentiality provided by the tax haven, 
in particular on the absence of exchange of information between the tax haven and the 
residence country.  See Vann (1998, pp. 759-761).  In part because of the success of the 
anti-abuse legislation considered below, this evasion is probably more important than 
                                                 
11The income may be subject to withholding tax, but this is may be lower than the corporate income tax that 
would be due if the parent reported the income currently, especially if the tax haven has a tax treaty with 
the residence country. 
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corporate use of tax havens to achieve deferral and has been characterized as “the 
weakest point in the entire world fiscal system.” (See Kudrle and Eden, 2003, p. 53.)  
 
 2. Active investment 
 Corporate tax haven activity is, of course, not limited to passive investments; 
controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) can also be used to defer residence-country 
taxation of business income.  Blessing (2000, p. 18:2) describes the following “paradigm 
for structuring operations with respect to a traditional manufacturing-distributing 
enterprise” to achieve “the objective of unbundling functions and placing them in 
jurisdictions that are compatible with tax reductions”: 
 
• First, a CFC (“Principal), resident in a low-tax jurisdiction owns relevant 
intangibles; is the hub that arranges the manufacturing, distribution, and other 
functions; owns the goods; and derives residual profits. 
• An affiliated or unaffiliated toll manufacturer ... or contract manufacturer 
manufactures the goods on behalf of the CFC for a modest fee.12 
• An affiliated commissionaire (a sale agent that acts in its own name for a 
modest commission) or a stripped buy-sell distributor (a distributor that 
acquires ownership and resells the goods, incurring relatively little risk, for a 
modest profit) sells the goods in a the local market. 
• One or more affiliated service entities might perform procurement, invoicing 
shipping, and other back-office functions for Principal for a modest fee.13 
 
 In these scenarios (and others), unbundling functions and interposing the tax 
haven between them is advantageous, even if income is not shifted between countries, 
because repatriation and current taxation by the country of residence is deferred.14  These 
                                                 
12In either case the manufacturer acts in an agency capacity.  In the first case it does not take title to the 
materials or goods; in the second case it does take title. 
13Rosenbloom (2000, p. 35.6) notes, “Tax havens ... raise problems without regard to arbitrage, even if 
transfer prices in the United States and the other country are identical.”  For further elementary descriptions 
of the mechanics of tax havens, see Arnold (1986) and (2001). 
14There may be other reasons to establish such a corporate structure (or not to do so). 
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tax haven activities would not be attractive if foreign-source income were taxed 
currently, without deferral. 
 
B. Income Shifting in “Simple” Transfer Pricing Cases 
 When affiliated parts of a multinational enterprise (MNE) engage in transactions 
with each other, it is necessary to specify “transfer prices” to be used to value the 
transactions.  There is often an incentive to choose transfer prices that shift income from 
high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions.15   This implies that low-tax source countries are less 
likely than high-tax countries to experience transfer pricing problems.  This implies, in 
turn, that one of the best ways for LDCTs to minimize the need to monitor transfer prices 
is to impose low tax rates.  This defense is not adequate, however, once a tax haven is 
interposed, as in the next part of this section.  Thin capitalization and similar rules may be 
useful in combating abuse in such cases; see Section III.D. 
 It is instructive to construct a simple example to illustrate the benefits of 
manipulating transfer prices.  Suppose that a parent corporation resident in nation R 
develops technology that it licenses to a production subsidiary in nation P, which in turn 
markets its product through a sister subsidiary in nation M.  Suppose further that R has 
the highest tax rate of the three countries and M has the lowest.  Suppose alternatively 
that nation R exempts foreign-source income or taxes worldwide income and allows 
credits for foreign taxes, but repatriation can be postponed.  There is an incentive to 
manipulate transfer prices to shift income from both the parent and the marketing 
subsidiary to the production subsidiary, and thus from countries R and M to country P, 
where it will be subject to the lowest tax rate. 
 The facts assumed in constructing this example are deliberately simple; it 
involves only transfer prices for technology and a finished product.  In fact, the world is 
much more complex, and it is also necessary to establish transfer prices for a wide range 
                                                 
15This is most obvious in the case of MNEs resident in countries that exempt foreign-source income.  The 
situation of MNEs resident in countries that tax worldwide income is more complicated, depending on 
whether residence-country taxation can be deferred, rules for averaging foreign income and tax credits, and 
the availability of excess (or deficits of) foreign tax credits.  Slemrod (1995) provides a masterful 
description of the conditions under which it is advantageous to shift income.  For present purposes it is 
assumed that income shifting is beneficial. 
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of other transactions, among them intermediate products, other intangible assets and 
products, financial products, services, and technical assistance. 
 
C. Combining Tax Havens and Transfer Pricing 
 A key feature of the “simple” transfer pricing scenario considered above is that 
the benefits of manipulating transfer prices for a MNE whose parent is resident in a 
country that taxes worldwide income depend on differences in tax rates in source and 
residence countries.  Once transfer pricing and tax havens are combined, the benefits of 
manipulating transfer prices increase dramatically and depend differences in tax rates in 
the source and residence countries and in the tax haven, assumed for simplicity to be 
zero, rather than on differences in tax rates in source and residence countries. 
 To see the difference in these two situations we modify the previous example so 
that a holding company resident in a tax haven acquires the patent to the technology from 
its parent and owns not only the production and manufacturing subsidiaries, but also a 
tax-haven subsidiary that buys from the production subsidiary and sells to the marketing 
subsidiary.16  In the absence of anti-abuse legislation, there is an incentive to use transfer 
pricing to attribute as much income as possible to the holding company, where it will be 
subject to little or no taxation as long as it is not repatriated.  (If the marketing subsidiary 
is located in the country of residence of the parent, transfer pricing can be used to shift 
income to the tax haven and thereby avoid current R-country taxation.)  This incentive 
exists, even if all three (non-haven) tax rates are the same.  And, because the incentives 
depend on the level of the three rates, rather than their differences, the stakes in transfer 
pricing are substantially greater than in ether of the “simple” cases described earlier, and 
a low-tax strategy may not suffice to protect the tax base of a source country. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16  The true fabric of tax “avoision” that can be woven from the interplay of transfer pricing and tax havens 
is, of course, far more complex than this simple example suggests.  For further descriptions of the 
mechanics of tax havens, see Gordon (1981), Doggart (1985), Arnold (1986), and OECD (1987).  The 
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4. Mending the Tears: Transfer Pricing 
 All countries with inward or outward foreign investment – which is just about all 
countries – face the need to monitor transfer prices. It will be convenient to begin by 
ignoring the existence of tax havens and examine solutions to “simple” problems of 
transfer pricing. 
 
A. Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
 Most developed countries specify rules to be used in establishing and monitoring 
transfer prices.  In general, the objective is to approximate prices that would be charged 
in arm’s length transactions with an unrelated party (e.g., an unrelated  buyer, seller, 
borrower, or lender). 
 Traditional methods.  The United States, which has the most elaborate rules, 
initially specified three rules: comparable uncontrolled price (CUP), cost plus a margin, 
and resale price minus a margin.  The OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines (1995), 
which greatly influence international practice, envisages use of similar “traditional” rules 
when possible. 
 Transactional net margin methods.  Since it may sometimes be difficult to 
implement any of the traditional rules, especially when intangible assets are involved, the 
United States has added two non-traditional methods.  Similarly, the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines now include two additional methods, but their use is discouraged.17 
  Profit-split method.  Under one of these, the profit split method, profits (either 
total or residual) are divided among members of the controlled group.  Under the OECD 
approach the way total profits are split depends on functions performed and risks 
assumed.  The US allows the comparable profit split method to be used only when data 
on profitability of similar activities of uncontrolled taxpayers are available. Yet 
                                                                                                                                                 
ability to employ tax havens to reduce taxes is, of course, affected by the anti-abuse legislation considered 
in the next section. 
17O’Connor (1997) describes the application of both traditional and non-traditional methods.  See Lin 
(2003, pp. 109-116 and chapters 4-9) for both a summary description of the methods and detailed 
descriptions of transfer pricing practices in 6 countries (Canada, the United States, Japan, China, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore).  The OECD Guidelines explicitly rejects what it calls global formulary 
apportionment of the type used by the US states and the Canadian provinces to apportion the income of 
corporations operating in multiple jurisdictions. 
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Rosenbloom (2000, p. 35.9, n. 10) indicates that “CPM is probably the most common 
approach used today in applying the arm’s length method in the United States.” 
 The residual profit method is used when there are profits that cannot be explained 
by traditional methods, because of factors such as economies of scale or the existence of 
unique assets.  Lin (2003, p. 111) has noted that the US practice of attributing residual 
profits to the place where intangible assets have been developed is favorable to the 
United States.18  Fox and McIntyre (2003) note, by comparison, that “... the cost-plus 
method and the resale price method allowed them [MNEs] to shift all of their profits, 
aside from some modest amount, to tax havens” because they “allow the residual profits 
that a MNE derives from the exploitation of intangible property to be shifted to the 
country where the owner of the intangible property is resident.  By design the place of 
residency is often a tax haven.  In the bulk of cases, the bulk of the profits derived by 
MNEs come from the exploitation of intangible property.”  
 Transactional net margin method. The other non-traditional method, the 
transactional net margin method, examines profit margins, relative to a base such as 
costs, sales, or assets and thus operates in a manner similar to the cost plus and resale 
price methods. 
 Advance Pricing Agreements.  Some developed countries have developed 
procedures whereby taxpayers and the tax administration will agree in advance on the 
methodology to be used to establish transfer prices.  In some cases the tax administration 
of foreign countries may be party to the agreement; generally this is true only if a tax 
treaty exists between the two countries.19 
 
B. Transfer Pricing in LDCTs: Problems 
 LDCTs face several layers of overwhelming problems in the area of transfer 
pricing.  First, their legal framework (laws and regulations) may not deal adequately with 
the issue.  A publication that purports “to present all information available on transfer 
pricing into a single comprehensive reference work” and to be “the single most 
                                                 
18Moreover, under the “super-royalty” provisions of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, taxpayers can be required to 
adjust the transfer prices used to value transfers of technology to reflect the actual income an intangible 
generates. 
19Ring (2000) describes the history and practice of APAs. 
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authoritative source of information on the subject,” provides information on only 33 
countries, of which only 10 are not members of the OECD.20  Moreover, the UN reports 
that existing transfer pricing regulations, guidelines, and/or administrative requirements 
of 41 percent of developing countries surveyed did not address services and that 
regulations of two-thirds did not address technology transfers.  (UN, 1999, p. 29)  This 
neglect may reflect the neglect tax advisers have given to this problem until recently.  
The Appendix surveys what selected tax reform missions have had to say about transfer 
pricing. 
 Second, even where a legal framework for monitoring transfer pricing exists, an 
LDC may lack the administrative capacity, including specially trained economists, to deal 
with the problem, which is one of the most complex in the entire area of tax 
administration and compliance;21 by comparison, MNEs have teams of experts who are 
occupied with nothing else and may hire away skilled tax administrators. 
 Third, comparable uncontrolled transactions and relevant evidence on profitability 
are even less likely to exist and be accessible to tax administrators in LDCTs than in 
developed countries. 
                                                 
20See IBFD (looseleaf).  The 33 countries covered are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (Rep.), 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay.  Global 
surveys of transfer pricing practices conducted by Ernst & Young over the past 5 years have covered from 
12 to 22 of these countries; see Ernst & Young (1999), Ackerman and Hobster (2001), and Ackerman et 
al., (2002a), (2002b), and (2003).  The papers by Ackerman et al., discuss transfer pricing in Greece, 
Hungary, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.  The 40 countries listed here may not be 
the only ones that have transfer pricing guidelines.  The Tax Policy Staff of the Fiscal Affairs Department 
of the IMF, writing in 1990, reported, regarding practices in 21 LDCs, including 11 not listed above, 
that “the general indication is that countries attribute incomes and expenditures at ‘arm’s length.”  Cursory 
examination of the entries in the column for “attribution rule” in Table 4 (where “arm’s length” appears 
for some countries) suggests, however, that this may have been an unrealistic assessment.  Several CITs 
have issued guidelines, but are not included in these compilations. 
21Even before the United States added non-traditional methods of transfer pricing to Section 482, Schindler 
and Henderson (1985, p. 1171) noted, “Intercorporate transfer pricing under the scope of Code section 482 
is one of the most complex areas of international taxation.”   Addition of these methods further increases 
complexity.  Ikeda (1992) opined at the time the new guidelines were being considered, “At this stage, 
there is much uncertainty about the impact that the recent discussions on transfer pricing issues will have 
on developing countries.  Perhaps, as more sophisticated international tax principles are constructed for 
international income allocation, the problem of insufficient resources in developing countries, will become 
more serious.”   Fox and McIntyre (2003) conclude, “The experience in the developing countries since 
1995 with the new pricing methods has not been very encouraging.” 
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 Fourth, the typically long period that elapses before transfer pricing cases are 
settled, as well as the uncertainty of favorable outcomes,  may make cash-strapped 
LDCTs relatively uninterested in pursuing them. 
 All these problems are likely to be more serious in low-income LDCs than in 
those with higher incomes.  CITs, having recently benefitted from foreign technical 
assistance, may have more satisfactory legal structures, but lack administrative capacity. 
 It might also be noted that imposition of severe penalties for transfer pricing 
violations may have unintended and undesirable consequences, because of the 
uncertainty inherent in setting transfer prices.  Tax administrators are likely to treat over- 
and understatement of income differently, adjusting income upward, and perhaps 
imposing penalties, where it seems appropriate to do so, but not reducing income, where 
appropriate – and there is not counterpart to the penalty for understating income.  
Because of this asymmetry, the risk of heavy penalties may discourage investment.22 
 Ikeda (1992), at the end of a survey that focuses on experience in six developed 
countries, concludes: 
 
A transfer pricing policy is an important issue for developing as well as 
developed countries.  Since taxation of foreign-related businesses often 
represents a substantial part of total tax revenue in developing countries, it 
is not just a matter of tax equity but also one of economic necessity to be 
able to tap the tax potential of multinational, enterprises.  On the other 
hand, these countries are seriously beset by practical difficulties in 
applying transfer pricing rules, because their administrations in most cases 
have only limited resources to cope with complicated international tax 
issues. 
 
 A UN survey reveals that, of developing countries with enough evidence to make 
a judgement, 61 percent estimated that domestic multinational enterprises were engaged 
                                                 
22See Newlon (2000, pp. 230-31.  Newlon notes that there may be an incentive to over-report income in 
jurisdictions that impose heavy penalties; of course, this potential revenue enhancing effect may be more 
than offset by the tendency of heavy penalties to deter investment. 
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in income shifting and 84 percent believed that foreign enterprises were doing so; 70 
percent and 87 percent, respectively, of these countries thought the problem to be 
significant.23 
 Because of differences in laws, regulations, and their interpretation, as well as 
because of weaknesses in tax administration, corporations may not report the same 
transfer prices for a given transaction in all countries.  (IFA, 2001a, reports differences in 
transfer pricing policies applied to electronic commerce.)  Thus income flowing across 
international borders may be undertaxed.  Adoption of international standards for transfer 
pricing, such as those in the OECD Model Treaty and Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
would help alleviate problems caused by diverse legal frameworks, but not those caused 
by inadequate administration. 
 If all countries used the same transfer pricing rules, interpreted them in the same 
way, and were effective in doing so, undertaxation could not occur.  But uniform 
application of transfer pricing rules would require international cooperation in 
administration of transfer pricing.  Such cooperation could take several forms.  At the 
very least there would be exchange of information on transfer pricing, to assure that the 
same transfer pricing were being reported to both source and residence countries.  Since 
exchange of information ordinarily occurs only in the context of a tax treaty, and there 
are relatively few treaties between developed countries and LDCs, there is little such 
cooperation.  This problem is aggravated by the interposition of tax havens between 
source and residence countries, since tax havens enter into few tax treaties. 
 Even if a multinational corporation does report on a uniform basis everywhere, a 
transfer pricing adjustment by one country will not necessarily result in an offsetting 
adjustment elsewhere.  In theory mutual adjustment procedures (MAPs), arbitration, and 
multilateral advance pricing agreements could be used to prevent this.  But, again, lack of 
treaties, as well as the fact that MAPs take a long time and generally are not binding on 
competent authorities, stands in the way.  Moreover, domestic laws of developed 
countries or the OECD model treaty and transfer pricing guidelines may attribute to 
LDCTS less income than some believe is appropriate.  As noted above, US interpretation 
                                                 
23UN (1999, p. 31).  The latter figures are presumably percentages of the countries thought to have a 
problem.  This source does not, unfortunately, indicate which countries – or even how many – responded to 
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of the residual profit split method would attribute the lion’s share of income from 
intangibles to the United States, leaving little to market jurisdictions.  Also, the OECD as 
concluded that application of the standard transfer pricing methodology would attribute 
little e-commerce income to market states.24 
 
C. Combining Transfer Pricing and Tax Havens 
 Combating the type of transfer pricing problems created by the combination of 
transfer pricing and tax havens, described in the last part of the previous section, poses 
even greater problems.  Cooperation between source and residence countries (or between 
source countries) to prevent inconsistent reporting of transfer prices on the same 
transaction would be ineffective in preventing revenue cracks, since, from a legal point of 
view, the tax haven is interposed between the interested countries and it would not be a 
party to such cooperation.  Stanley Surrey, writing in 1978, described the problem as 
follows:  
 
[T]he United States considered that its parent companies were not 
charging interest, not being paid for services, not requiring royalties, and 
not charging proper prices for good sold.  Yet it is the developing 
countries who are most vocal in asserting that they are being imposed on 
by parent companies of international enterprises.  Thus it is asserted that 
the subsidiary companies in the developing countries are being charged 
excessive interest rates, being overcharged excessive interest rates, being 
overcharged for unneeded services, being charged excessive royalties, and 
being overcharged for goods purchased.  (Surrey, 1978, p. 431) 
                                                                                                                                                 
the survey or thought they had enough evidence to make a judgement. 
24These issues go beyond transfer pricing.  Under international conventions a source country can tax 
business profits only if earned by a permanent establishment (PE) in the country, where such profits are 
measured by the application of arm’s length pricing.  E-commerce creates the ability to exploit a market 
without resort to a PE, and even if a PE exists in the market country, standard transfer-pricing 
methodologies would  not attribute much income to it.  For further discussion, see McLure (2003, pp. 303, 
305-6) and references cited there. Solutions that are conceptually possible, if politically unlikely or 
technically difficult, might  include relaxing or redefining the PE test, so that a significant economic 
presence implied jurisdiction to tax; including a restricted force of attraction rule in tax treaties; allowing 
withholding taxes on sales of digital content; and altering the methodology of transfer pricing, perhaps even 
replacing it with formulary apportionment.  See McLure (2003, pp. 306-309) and references cited there. 
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After writing, “Clearly the two images cannot be describing the same transactions,” 
Surrey adds the following in a footnote: 
 
The two images cannot be describing the same direct transaction.  But 
such differing images can coexist as to indirect transactions, involving a 
tax haven.  The parent company could undercharge on the transaction 
between it and the tax haven subsidiary and the subsidiary could 
overcharge on the related transaction between it and the subsidiary in the 
developing country, so that a larger profit will reside in the tax haven.  
Hence, one tax administrator could see an undercharge and the other an 
overcharge as respects the basic transaction.  (Surrey, 1978, p. 431, n. 52; 
emphasis in original) 
 
 Vann (1998, p. 797) summarizes the situation as follows: “Because of the 
sophistication of international tax planning and its frequent combination of domestic law, 
tax havens, and tax treaties, the taxation of nonresident direct investors by developing 
and transition countries is not an easy task.” 
  
D. Thin Capitalization and Similar Rules 
 Many LDCs, when faced with the specter of undercapitalization (and thus 
excessive use of debt) and payment of excessive interest rates and fees for technical 
services by local subsidiaries, have resorted to thin capitalization rules, disallowance of 
full deduction for certain categories of expenses, and withholding taxes on certain 
payments.  Such “meat ax” rules avoid the difficulty of monitoring transfer prices to limit 
abuse, but may encounter objections from treaty partners unless carefully structured.  
(See  Oldman, Rosenbloom, and Youngman (1991, p. 393-94.) 
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5. Mending the Tears: Anti-deferral Rules 
 Some would not consider the deferral involved in “simple” tax haven cases 
described in section III to involve abuse; in that view tax havens simply facilitate the 
realization of the paradigm described in the section on the international tax system: 
residence-country taxation of repatriated income and deferral of residence-country tax on 
income that is not repatriated (with source country taxation in the meantime). Others do 
not like the results described, perhaps because they advocate capital export neutrality, 
which requires current home-country taxation of worldwide income, with credits for 
foreign taxes.25  By comparison, most would probably consider using tax havens to evade 
residence-country taxes and combining the use of tax havens and manipulation of transfer 
pricing to involve abuse, especially when the latter involves domestic funds making a 
round-trip for investment in the home market disguised as foreign investment.  For 
whatever reason, some countries that impose residence-based taxes – and, indeed, some 
that do not26 – have enacted controlled foreign corporation (CFC) legislation to limit the 
ability of MNEs to defer income attributed to tax haven subsidiaries.27  Efforts one 
country makes to prevent abuse may have repercussions on others. 
                                                 
25Thus Arnold and Dibout (2001, pp. 38-39) write: 
The unlimited deferral of residence country tax on the income of foreign corporations owned by residents is 
difficult to justify. Deferral encourages residents to divert income, especially passive income, to CFCs in 
low-tax countries and to accumulate such income in those CFCs rather than repatriate the funds to the 
parent corporation. It violates the fundamental principles of equity and capital export neutrality on which 
worldwide taxation are based. Proponents of deferral, however, argue for the preservation of deferral, 
especially for business income, on grounds of international competitiveness or capital import neutrality.  
Under this view of neutrality, a multinational enterprise doing business in a country through a subsidiary 
there should be subject to tax only at the rate applicable in that country so that it can compete equally with 
other corporations doing business in that country. 
For a critical view of capital export neutrality, see Graetz (2001). 
26France employs CFC legislation because it taxes only business income on a territorial basis; it taxes 
investment income on a worldwide basis.  Its CFC legislation is intended to prevent diverting passive 
income to a tax haven subsidiary and accumulating investment income is such a corporation.  Also, in the 
absence of legislation, passive income received by the tax-haven could be distributed to the parent as a tax-
free dividend.  See Arnold (1986, pp. 134, 201-4.)  
27For a brief description the rationale and functioning of CFC legislation, see Arnold (1986) and (2000), 
OECD (1996), and Arnold and Dibout (2001).  The national reports in IFA (2001b) summarizes practice in 
30 countries.  Much of the following description is based on Arnold and Dibout (2001, especially pp. 30-
57.)  Taylor and Richman (1965, p. 81) describe a pre-1960 scheme used by Colombians to evade tax: 
forming foreign companies in Panama or Venezuela to do business in Colombia.  In theory, CFC 
legislation would have prevented this ploy; in fact, it is almost certain that it would not have, for 
administrative reasons.  Colombia relied instead on increased withholding taxes on branch profits and 
dividends.  Of course, neither of these would have prevented manipulation of transfer prices to shift income out of the 
country. 
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A.  Basic Features of CFC rules 
 Under CFC legislation, certain income of foreign subsidiaries located in low-tax 
jurisdictions and controlled by domestic parents is treated as if it were distributed 
currently, and is thus subject to current taxation by the parent’s country of residence, 
rather than being taxed only when repatriated.28  Arnold and Dibout (2001, p. 40) note:  
 
The basic function of the CFC rules of every country is to distinguish 
between acceptable (or good) and unacceptable (or bad) deferral. ... For 
most countries with CFC rules, the distinction between good and bad 
deferral is usually drawn on the basis of three factors.  In general, deferral 
is considered to be unacceptable and is eliminated under CFC rules if: 
 (a) residents control or have a substantial interest in the foreign corporation;  
 (b) the income derived by the CFC is passive investment income or base company  
 income and not genuine business income; and 
 (c) the income derived by the CFC is subject to a low rate of foreign tax. 
 
 Definitions of control, what constitutes a low-tax regimes, and the type of income 
that is considered “tainted” vary from country-to-country and cannot be described in 
detail here.  (See, however, IFA, 2001b.)  All countries that have CFC legislation 
disallow deferral of tax on income from passive investments (which generally includes 
interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and capital gains), some extend the definition of 
“tainted” income to “base company income” (a concept to be described below), and some 
tax virtually all income earned by subsidiaries located in certain countries.  Most 
countries use “black lists” of tax haven countries, some use white lists, and some use gray 
lists.  Whether a country is on a black list may depend simply on the tax rates in the 
country in question, but that determination is generally more nuanced. 
                                                 
28For example, under US law a CFC is a foreign corporation in which more than 50 percent of the voting power or 
market value of the corporation is owned by US persons each of whom owns at least 10 percent of voting stock.  
Income of a passive foreign investment company (PFIC) may also be subject to current taxation.  A corporation may be 
classified as a PFIC in any year in which at least 75 percent of its gross income is passive or at least 50 percent of its 
assets produce passive income.   
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 “Base company income” is the term commonly used to describe tainted income 
other than passive income.   The most important kind of base company income is income 
a CFC derives from selling property or rendering services outside the jurisdiction where 
the CFC is incorporated or to related parties. 
 CFC legislation generally is not intended merely to prevent deferral.  It represents 
an attempt to prevent the loss of tax revenue created by combining transfer pricing 
manipulation with tax havens.  Thus Arnold and Dibout (2001, p. 54) state: 
 
The inclusion of income from related-party transactions in tainted income 
is usually intended to bolster a country’s transfer pricing rules. Transfer 
pricing rules are intended to prevent the diversion of income to related 
foreign corporations through the non-arm’s length pricing of sales, 
service, and other transactions.  These rules are notoriously difficult to 
enforce. By treating such income as tainted income for the purposes of 
CFC rules, countries can avoid the necessity of applying their transfer 
pricing rules. 
 
Similarly, the OECD (1996, p. 10) states: 
 
Without CFC legislation, it would be easy for a resident taxpayer in the 
AL/SA [arm’s length/separate accounting] system to avoid domestic 
taxation on its foreign income (and, indeed, to some extent, even on its 
domestic income) simply by interposing a foreign corporation in a 
territory with a lower level of taxation to receive such income instead of 
remitting ir to the home country (or equivalently, to charge deductible 
arm’s length fees to domestic taxpayers in respect to certain services 
rendered. 
 
It thus describes CFC legislation as “back stop” against the difficulty of administering 
transfer pricing rules.  It goes on to note that, “... unless the legislation applies to all types 
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of income, active, as well as passive, it will be of limited use in this respect.”  (OECD, 
1996, p. 11) 
 The United States enacted the world’s first CFC legislation in 1962 and by 1986 
only five other countries (Canada, Germany, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom) 
had done so.  Since then the practice has grown rapidly, and Arnold and Dibout (2001) 
report that 23 countries had adopted CFC legislation or were in the process of doing so by 
the end of 2000.29  Not surprisingly, it is primarily the major capital-exporting countries 
and other members of the OECD that have taken this step.  But it seems likely that the list 
of countries with CFC legislation will grow, perhaps rapidly, in part because of the recent 
OECD recommendations, to be considered below.30 
 
B.  Effectiveness of CFC Rules 
 Arnold (2000, p. 17:14) suggests that “CFC rules are reasonably successful in 
preventing the worst cases of tax haven abuse,” situations involving diversion or 
accumulation of passive income to/in tax havens.  He believes, however, that CFC rules 
are less effective in dealing with foreign base company income.  He cites opposition to 
CFC rules by multinational enterprises as evidence of the “core effectiveness” of the 
rules. 
                                                 
29Arnold and Dibout (2001) list the following countries with CFC rules in chronological order based on the 
year in which the rules were adopted: United States, 1962; Canada, 1972; Germany, 1972; Japan, 1978; 
France, 1980; United Kingdom, 1984; New Zealand, 1988; Australia, 1990; Sweden, 1990; Norway, 1992; 
Denmark, 1995; Finland, 1995; Indonesia, 1995; Portugal, 1995; Spain, 1995; Hungary, 1997; Mexico, 
1997; South Africa, 1997; South Korea, 1997; Argentina, 1999; Israel (proposed), 2000; Italy, 2000; 
Estonia, 2000. They note that the Hungarian CFC rules were so significantly diluted effective 1 January 
2001 that it may no longer be appropriate to categorize them as CFC rules. 
30The national report for several countries in IFA (2001b) mention the influence of the OECD project on 
harmful tax competition.  Thus:  “In a general sense, the OECD issues on harmful tax competition were, 
among others, an important element to be taken into account in introducing legal reforms to the Income 
Tax Law at the end of 1999.” (Argentina, p. 335)  Similarly,  “[F]ollowing international trends, although it 
is not a member of the OECD or of the EU, Brazil will closely follow the guidelines established by the 
OECD as regards controlling operations performed with beneficiaries located in countries with favorable 
tax treatment.”  (Brazil, p. 430) Finally, “The Ministry of Finance understands and supports the OECD 
and EU initiatives against harmful tax competition. Additionally, it should be emphasised that 
such initiatives indirectly gave the ground and justified the introduction from 2001 of the provisions which 
require reporting of transactions with entities in low-tax jurisdictions.”  (Poland (766).  By comparison, the 
national report for Peru (p. 758) says, “The projects of the OECD and EU against harmful tax competition 
have not necessarily influenced the proposed internal tax norms, which, if approved by Congress, would go 
into effect starting in 2001.” 
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 Unilateral anti-abuse measures are not a panacea, for either developed countries 
or LDCTs.  First, without access to information on tax haven activities of their residents, 
it will be difficult to enforce CFC and similar anti-deferral legislation.  For developed 
countries with close supervision of corporations, gaining information on CFCs owned by 
domestic parents, especially those that are publicly traded, should be relatively easy.  But 
for individuals in both developed countries and LDCTs and for corporations resident in 
LDCTs, the problem is likely to be more daunting.  The requisite information is not likely 
to be forthcoming, unless it is provided by the tax haven – up to now a forlorn hope.  This 
points up the importance of the OECD project discussed below.   Even if tax havens were 
willing to provide information, many LDCTs probably lack the administrative capacity to 
implement CFC legislation. 
 Second, some American multinationals have engaged in “inversion” transactions, 
in which the parent becomes a foreign corporation and its domestic activities those of a 
subsidiary.31  (The ability to do this is predicated on the unusual test the United States 
employs to determine residence.  Switching to the more common test based on “place of 
effective management and control” would make this ploy much more costly, as it would 
require moving management and control to a tax haven.)  The result is that CFC 
legislation becomes irrelevant and income can be accumulated in the tax haven 
subsidiary.  This could have negative effects on the fiscal situation of LDCTs, by putting 
income shifted to tax havens beyond the reach of the US government.  Moreover, it 
seems likely that domestic companies operating in LDCTs could also engage in inversion 
transactions, if the CFC legislation of those countries started to bite. 
 Third, CFC legislation generally does not apply when real activity is being 
conducted in the low-tax jurisdiction.  This could be crucially important, since many e-
commerce activities could be lodged in PEs located in low-tax jurisdictions.  This topic, 
which is greatest relevance for developed countries, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 See US Department of the Treasury (2002), Dimon (2002), Avi-Yonah (2002), and Desai and Hines 
(2002). 
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C.  CFC Rules and LDCTs 
 Whether CFC rules should apply when it is only foreign taxes that are being 
avoided (that is, when the taxes of the residence country of the parent are not being 
avoided) is a controversial issue.32  Arnold (1986, p. 466) gives the example of a French 
or US-controlled manufacturing company established in a high-tax foreign country that 
uses a tax haven subsidiary to sell its products, the policy question being whether French 
or US anti-tax haven rules should apply to the income of the tax haven subsidiary, even if 
the only tax being avoided is that of the country where the manufacturing company is 
established.  The French or US rules may apply in this situation.  (The rules of New 
Zealand and Sweden apply to all income of CFCs, and thus to the income in question.)  
By comparison, most countries apply their CFC rules only if their own taxes are being 
avoided. 
 We have seen above, many LDCTs lack the ability to enforce transfer pricing and 
other anti-abuse rules. It appears that if more developed countries were to adopt the more 
inclusive approach it could have beneficial effects on LDCTS, by making it less 
advantageous to attribute to tax havens income that is properly attributable to LDCTs.33  
The more restricted view appears to leave substantial latitude and incentive to shift 
income from LDCTs to tax havens.  It can be argued, of course, that no country has any 
responsibility “... to act as a fiscal policemen to enforce another country’s tax system.”  
(Arnold, p. 466)  Moreover, as Kudrle and Eden argue (2003, p. 61) there are “prisoner’s 
dilemma elements” to the decision to enforce tough anti-abuse rules.  “[W[hile all states 
would benefit from increased vigilance of other home countries in making certain that 
their subsidiaries do not use havens to avoid paying full taxes due, both special interest 
politics and perhaps national economic interest suggest that there is less incentive to 
assiduously police their own firms.” 
 For a variety of reasons, many LDCTs have not focused on anti-deferral rules.  
First, where exchange controls exist and are implemented effectively, it is unlikely that 
the foreign investment required to capitalize a CFC would be allowed.  If exchange 
                                                 
32See Arnold (1986, pp. 134, 466) for further discussion. 
33Arnold (1986, pp. 466, 505-6) notes, however, that if both France or the US and the other high-tax 
country were apply anti-abuse rules, double taxation might result. 
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controls are not effective, it is unlikely that CFC rules would be.  The increased 
liberalization of capital markets can be expected to lead to the elimination of exchange 
controls and suggest the need for CFC legislation. 
 Second, some countries export so little capital whatever limited administrative 
resources they have available to deal with international issues should probably be 
concentrated on administering transfer prices and undercapitalization, rather than CFC 
legislation.34  Writing of the effectiveness of extant CFC rules, Arnold (2000, p. 17:14) 
writes, “[T[he effectiveness of the rules is questionable because of inadequate or non-
existent enforcement by tax authorities.  Any tax rules that require the computation and 
verification of the income of foreign entities cause significant enforcement problems fo 
the residence country.  Few countries have the tax administration resources to enforce 
CFC rules effectively at the margin.”  The scarcity of administrative resources is, of 
course, vastly worse in most LDCTs than in developed countries. 
 Finally, without the cooperation of tax havens, it is unlikely that LDCTS would 
have the information needed to enforce CFC rules. 
 
6. The OECD Initiative on Harmful Tax Competition 
 In 1996 the OECD undertook to “develop measures to counter the distorting 
effects of harmful tax competition on investment and financing decisions and the 
consequences for national tax bases.”35   It noted in 1998: “Tax havens serve three main 
purposes: they provide a location for holding passive investments ('money boxes'); they 
provide a location where 'paper' profits can be booked; and they enable the affairs of 
taxpayers, particularly their bank accounts, to be effectively shielded from scrutiny by tax 
authorities of other countries.”36 Its first target has thus been tax regimes intended to 
attract geographically mobile activities, such as financial and other service activities, 
                                                 
34Thus Arnold and Dibout (2001, p. 28) note, “Other countries, such as Poland, which were subject just a 
few years ago to a planned economy and which are opening up to the multinationals’ activities, are 
discovering at the same time the complexity of the fiscal questions connected with internationalization of 
trade and the need for developing appropriate taxation legislation. ... Such countries’ concern with 
protecting their tax base against international avoidance is expressed more, in the current state of 
development of their adaptation process, in rules relating to checking transfer prices and 
undercapitalization than in provisions that are specifically aimed at low-taxation regimes abroad.” 
35Ministerial Communique of May 1996, quoted in OECD (1998, Foreward). 
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including the provision of intangibles, whether located in tax havens or OECD members.  
Although the project explicitly did not target not savings instruments such as bank 
deposits, its greatest immediate effect may lie in that area. 
 
A.  Tax Havens and Preferential Regimes 
 The OECD used four key factors to identify tax havens and preferential tax 
regimes found in member nations: 
 –  little or no tax on the income in question; 
 – no effective exchange of information; 
 – lack of transparency; and 
– no need for local substantive presence or prohibition of local commercial impact 
in the case of tax havens; “ring-fencing” in the case of preferential regimes.37 
Based on these criteria, the OECD tentatively identified 47 preferential tax regimes found 
in member states and compiled a list of tax havens. 
 In the 2004 Progress Report on its Project on Harmful Tax Competition the 
OECD indicated that, of the 47 potentially harmful regimes found in OECD members, 18 
have been (or are being) abolished, 14 have been amended to eliminate potentially 
harmful features, and 13 were found upon further examination not to be harmful.  Only 
two regimes (Switzerland’s “50/50 Practice” and Luxembourg’s 1929 Holding Company 
regime) remain, and they are being modified.38   
 Progress on elimination of tax haven regimes is no less impressive, with 33 
countries and jurisdictions that might otherwise have been characterized as 
“uncooperative tax havens” having committed to principles of effective exchange of 
information and transparency.  Only 5 jurisdictions (Andorra, Liberia, Liechtenstein, the 
Marshall Islands, and Monaco) remain on the list of uncooperative tax havens.39 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
36OECD (1998, ¶ 49). 
37OECD (1998, ¶s 52, 59). 
38OECD (2004, ¶s 12, 15).  Switzerland has agreed to effective exchange of information with respect to 
holding companies in the context of bilateral treaties.  Luxembourg has submitted legislation to its 
Parliament to make its 1929 Holding Company regime consistent with the EU Code of Conduct, but has 
not addresses effective exchange of information. (¶ 15) 
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B.  The Model Agreement on Exchange of Information 
 As the previous discussion of tax havens makes clear, secrecy and lack of access 
to information are key to the success of some tax haven operations.  Substantial progress 
has been achieved on this score.  Anonymous bank accounts can no longer be opened in 
any OECD country and the “vast majority” of the non-OECD jurisdictions that have 
agreed to transparency and exchange of information have immobilized or eliminated 
bearer shares.40  A particularly positive development has been the drafting of a Model 
Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters (OECD, 2002) by a working 
group consisting of both OECD members and erstwhile tax havens.41  Article 5 of this 
model provides a) that (subject to safeguards, e.g., for relevance, non-disclosure of trade 
or business secrets, and confidentiality) the country receiving a request for information 
must provide the information if it is necessary for enforcement of the treaty partner’s 
taxes, even if the requested country does not need the information for its own tax 
purposes, and b) that its competent authority must have the authority to obtain and 
provide information held, inter alia, by banks, other financial institutions, and persons 
acting in an agency or fiduciary capacity and information on ownership of companies 
trusts, etc.  These provisions are important because they explicitly modify the existing 
terms of Article 26 of the OECD Model Treaty, which allows a country to refuse a 
request for exchange of information that would not be obtainable in the normal course of 
administration or that would be “contrary to public policy.”42  In particular, the Model 
                                                                                                                                                 
39OECD (2004, ¶s 19, 27). 
40OECD (2003b), (2004, ¶ 26). 
41The non-OECD members of this working group are Aruba, Bermuda, Bahrain, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, 
the Isle of Man, Malta, Mauritius, the Netherlands Antilles, the Seychelles and San Marino.  The word 
“erstwhile” modifying “tax havens” should perhaps appears in quotations marks, because, as explained 
below, it appears that for many purposes, these tax havens will not cease to be tax havens.  Another 
working group is charged with developing accounting standards to be used for the maintenance and 
exchange of information.  OECD (2003b), (2004, ¶s 22-27). 
42Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Model Treaty, which is explained further in the Commentary thereto 
(OECD, 2003) states: 
2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed so as to impose on a Contracting State the 
obligation: 
a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative practice of that or of 
the other Contracting State; 
b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the 
administration of that or of the other Contracting State; 
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Agreement explicitly clarifies that exchange of information cannot be refused on grounds 
that it would be “contrary to public policy,” as represented by laws guaranteeing bank 
secrecy, as happens today. 
 The Model Agreement has already formed the basis for several recently signed 
exchange of information agreements.43  Such agreements are potentially extremely useful 
in combating the use of tax havens by individuals to evade taxes.  It is crucial, however, 
that all financial centers must follow the standards set forth in the Model Agreement, if 
those that do so are not to be placed at a competitive disadvantage relative to those that 
do not and to avoid “the migration of business” to centers that do no cooperate.  (See 
OECD, 2002, ¶4)  The “defensive measures” discussed below should help to achieve this 
result.  More important for present purposes, as explained below, there would seem to be 
little likelihood that the erstwhile tax havens will exchange information with LDCTs. 
 
C.  Defensive Measures 
 Tax havens are not responding only to moral suasion.  The OECD has urged its 
members to undertake “coordinated defensive measures” to combat tax haven activities.  
Among the defensive measures that it suggests might be used are these: 
 
• Disallowance of deductions, exemptions, credits, and other allowances for 
payments made to persons located in jurisdictions engaged in harmful tax 
practices, except where the taxpayer can establish that the payments are made 
at  arm’s length; 
• Thin capitalization rules restricting deductions for interest payments made to 
persons located in jurisdictions engaged in harmful tax practices; 
                                                                                                                                                 
c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional 
secret or trade process, or information, the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre 
public). 
OECD (2004, ¶ 24) notes that this Model Agreement is being used as the basis for revising Article 26. 
43OECD (2004, ¶ 24).  The OECD reports that since 2000, the United States has signed agreements with 
Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, 
Jersey and the Netherlands Antilles and that other OECD members such as Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Spain are in the process of negotiating similar agreements.  See OECD (2003b, p. 19) 
Transfer Pricing and Tax Havens: 
Mending the LDC Revenue Net 
 
 
27
• Requiring that taxpayers report payments, transactions, and ownership 
involving  persons located in jurisdictions engaged in harmful tax practices; 
• Taxation of residents on income that benefits from harmful tax practices; 
• Denial of exemptions and modification of foreign tax credits for income that 
is subject to little or no taxation because it arises in a  jurisdictions engaged in 
harmful tax practices; 
• Withholding taxes on dividends, interest, and royalties made to beneficial 
owners benefitting from harmful tax practices; 
• Coordination of enforcement activities involving entities and transactions 
related to jurisdictions engaged in harmful tax practices; 
• Terminating, avoiding, and limiting treaties with jurisdictions engaged in 
harmful tax practices.44 
 
D.  Implications 
 The OECD Project on harmful tax competition appears to have been quite 
successful, but only within a fairly narrow range.  It might also appear at first glance that 
success in the OECD efforts to combat harmful tax competition could have substantial 
benefits for LDCTS since, as the OECD noted in its initial report on harmful tax 
competition (1998, ¶88), “Residence countries can partly negate the effects of harmful 
preferential tax regimes in source countries...”  Closer examination reveals, however, 
that, as usual, LDCTs are likely to get only “crumbs from the table,” if that. 
 As intended, the primary effect of the project will be to reduce the possibility that 
individuals resident in developed countries can evade tax by making portfolio 
investments in or through tax havens.  Prospects do not, however, seem nearly as bright 
for LDCTs.  Erstwhile tax havens may feel compelled to conclude agreements to 
exchange information with economically and politically powerful developing countries, 
and perhaps even with some LDCTs, but it is hard to see why they would also feel similar 
pressure to conclude such agreements with most LDCTs, unless pressured to do so by 
                                                 
44OECD (2004, ¶ 30).  This list represents a refinement of the similar list appearing in (OECD (2000, ¶s 32-
38).  See OECD (1998), ¶s 97-169) for further elaboration of some of these items. 
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OECD members, something that does not seem to be contemplated.45  In the absence of 
such agreements, nothing will have changed, as far as the majority of LDCTs is 
concerned.  Indeed, to the extent that tax havens are no longer able to appeal effectively 
to residents of developed countries, they may redouble efforts to appeal to residents of 
LDCTs.46  Even with such an agreement in place, tax administration is not self-enforcing; 
tax administrations must actually request and utilize the available information – a tall 
order for LDCTs.  Of course, the risk that they might request and use information might 
deter some tax evasion. 
 Similarly, to combat the use of tax havens to defer domestic corporate taxes, 
LDCTs will need to rely on CFC legislation.  But they are unlikely to be able to enforce 
CFC legislation without information on tax haven corporations owned by their residents, 
even if they were to enact such legislation. As noted, they are unlikely to be able to 
conclude treaties that would provide access to such information. 
 There now exists an almost universally accepted “black list” of “un-cooperative 
tax haven jurisdictions” that is already extremely short and is likely to grow shorter, 
because of the threat that defensive measures will be applied multilaterally against 
jurisdictions remaining on the list.  If the noose is tight enough, harmful tax competition, 
as defined by the OECD, may follow preferential regimes in OECD members into 
extinction.  This does not mean, however, that corporate tax havens will cease to exist.  It 
appears that commitment to effective exchange of information and transparency is 
enough to get a jurisdiction removed from the list of  uncooperative tax havens; it seems 
almost certain that a jurisdiction could retain a key feature of corporate tax havens – little 
or no tax on the income in question -- without being put on the list of uncooperative tax 
                                                 
45Bentley (2003) writes, “A country that did not face extreme political or economic reprisals would not 
otherwise consider signing an agreement based on that model.” Kudrle and Eden (2003, p. 66) describe 
some of the pressures that could be brought to bear on tax havens: “The secrecy havens have little option 
but maximum cooperation because of their vulnerability to action by the OECD. One obvious response to 
non-cooperation would see the high income countries disallow the cost of debt financing from  non-
cooperating jurisdictions as a business expense for tax purposes. ... Even more drastic measures are clearly 
available including the denial of access to the banking systems of the G-7 countries and the severing of 
transportation links.”  It does not seem that similar threats by LDCTs would have much effect.  See Langer 
(2002) for a scathing critique of OECD policy that gives erstwhile tax havens nothing in return for signing 
exchange of information agreements, as well as an historical explanation of the development of tax havens. 
46I am grateful to Lee Burns for this point. 
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havens.47  As noted earlier, lack of exchange of information and transparency are 
presumably substantially less important than low tax rates for corporate tax havens, 
except in LDCTs.  This implies that, despite the apparent success of the OECD project, 
enactment and effective enforcement of CFC legislation will be required to prevent the 
use of tax havens to defer home-country corporate tax.  As noted earlier, the CFC 
legislation of most nations only applies to the extent that the income of the country of 
residence of the parent is being deferred; it would not prevent avoidance of source-
country tax in LDCTs. 
 Despite this generally gloomy picture, there may be a bit of light.  The OECD has 
given quasi-official multilateral approval of enactment of a specific list of defensive 
measures, by both source and residence countries, that limit the capacity to use tax 
havens and preferential regimes to avoid taxes.  Without such multilateral approval some 
of these measures might be condemned as draconian and out of step with best 
international practice.  LDCTs could invoke these defensive measures (e.g., disallowance 
of deductions for payments, thin capitalization rules restricting deductions for interest 
payments, and withholding taxes on dividends, interest, and royalties) against any 
jurisdiction that imposes “little or no tax on the income in question,” even if the 
jurisdiction is not engaging in “harmful tax competition,” as defined by the OECD.  Such 
measures may be more effective – and they certainly require fewer administrative 
resources – than attempting to monitor transfer prices or enforce CFC rules. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks: Can Tax Reform Mend the Tears? 
 The following excerpt from Jim Alm, Jorge Martinez, and Mark Rider’s 
description of the purpose of this conference seems a fitting place to conclude this 
exercise: 
 
[T[he last several decades have seen a dizzying array of different tax 
reforms around the world. ... However, despite the enormous amounts of 
time and resources invested in these reform efforts, the lessons from all of 
                                                 
47The OECD reiterated in the introduction to its 2004 report on the project on harmful tax competition, 
“The OECD does not seek to dictate to any country what its tax rate should be.” 
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this work have been very unevenly disseminated, and there are clearly 
many unresolved issues. It seems unlikely that these issues are going to go 
away. With the steady advance of such things as globalization, regional 
integration, and technology, it seems more likely that, if anything, the 
issues of adapting tax systems to new economic environments and 
reforming specific taxes will become even more pressing.  
 
To the extent that tax reform is a unilateral affair, the above discussion indicates clearly 
that the tax reforms of the last several decades could not have been expected to deal 
adequately with the revenue cracks created by tax havens and transfer pricing.  At best, 
source countries could have addressed the administration of transfer pricing and 
implemented thin capitalization and other anti-abuse rules, and residence countries could 
have enacted CFC rules.  All other progress would have required bilateral cooperation or 
multilateral action, neither of which can be imposed unilaterally.  What bilateral and 
multilateral action has occurred to date seems more likely to benefit developed countries 
than to help LDCTs mend the tears in their revenue nets. 
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APPENDIX 
Selected Tax Reform Missions and Transfer Pricing 
 Since transfer pricing seems to be a potentially important source of revenue 
cracks in LDCTS, it is instructive – or at least interesting – to look back to see what some 
of the major reports and surveys on tax reform in LDCs have had to say about transfer 
pricing. 
 Venezuela: Shoup report.  The Shoup mission to Venezuela, in 1958-59, noting 
that “only those costs or expenditures incurred within the country are deductible,” 
suggested. “In principle, deduction should be allowed for any expense ... which is 
connected with and properly allocable to income taxable in Venezuela.”  The report’s 
response to “the administrative problem that is posed by expenses incurred abroad by a 
business with branches or activities in both Venezuela and other countries,” was to 
propose “the taxpayer’s proving both the expense and its allocation in accordance with 
rules established by the Tax Administration.”  It continued, in a sentence that seems 
hopelessly naive by today’s standards, “One requirement might appropriately be that the 
claim for deduction be accompanied by the statement of a certified public accounting 
firm that the expense ... is connected with and properly allocable to Venezuelan activity 
under standard ac counting principles, together with an explanation of the method of 
allocation followed.”  (Shoup, et al., 1959, pp. 155-156)  The report subsequently (p. 
173) discussed the need for the tax administration to scrutinize transactions between 
taxpayers controlled by the same interests to prevent misallocation of income between 
them and, if necessary, compute the income of each to on the basis of a “fair price.”  It is 
not clear whether this discussion is intended to pertain to international transactions, or 
only domestic ones. 
 Colombia: Taylor and Musgrave reports.  The Taylor mission to Venezuela in the 
early 1960s expressed the same concern that the expense of services rendered abroad 
were not deductible and reached similar policy conclusions, including reliance on 
“customary accounting principles” and detailed proof that the claimed deductions are 
allocable to Colombian income.  (Taylor and Richman, 1965, p. 82) A few years later the 
Musgrave mission reached roughly the same conclusions.  (Musgrave, 1971, p. 87; Slitor, 
1971, p. 508) 
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 Jamaica, Bahl report.  One of the staff papers prepared for the Bahl mission to 
Jamaica identifies the transfer pricing problem:  “An effective review of returns filed by 
members of an affiliated group requires auditors to verify that prices, compensation, and 
other aspects of intercorporate transfers are computed on an arm’s length basis .... 
[U]nless transfer prices come under careful administrative scrutiny, their manipulation 
permits the shift of income to group members taxed at the lowest rates.”48  Although 
there are no detailed suggestions for the standard to be used in appraising transfer prices, 
the reference to the provisions of the U.S.-Jamaica tax treaty dealing with associated 
enterprises and mutual adjustment procedures is instructive. 
 Comparison.  The difference in concerns expressed in the Shoup, Taylor, and 
Musgrave reports and those expressed in the Bahl report is remarkable.  Whereas the first 
three reports rightly worried that deductions were not being allowed for expenses 
incurred abroad and expressed faith in outside auditors to certify the appropriateness of 
transfer prices, the Bahl report, written several decades later, identified clearly the need 
for “careful administrative scrutiny”of transfer prices. 
 Comment.  It appears that most tax reform studies have had relatively little to say 
about transfer pricing.49  It is easy to see why this would be true.  First, at the time the 
studies were done, direct foreign investment and intracorporate trade, especially in 
intangibles, were nowhere near as important as now.  Second, transfer pricing may have 
been a distinctly second (or third) order problem, because there were “other fish to fry,” 
namely undesirable structural elements in need of fundamental reform.  This would 
certainly seem to be the case in Venezuela more than 40 years ago and in Colombia 35 to 
40 years ago, where the issues did receive attention.  Third, techniques of tax avoidance 
                                                 
48 Oldman, Rosenbloom, and Youngman (1991, p. 393). The omitted words are: 
Otherwise, corporations could report, or “characterize,” intragroup transactions in whatever manner 
provided the maximum tax benefit.  Payments could be arbitrarily characterized as dividends, interest, 
royalties, or compensation, depending upon which was subject to the most beneficial sour e rules, avoided 
withholding taxes, or permitted a deduction for the payor.” 
Unlike the other three reports reviewed here, the Bahl Report also considered the need for thin cap rules, 
see Oldman, Rosenbloom, and Youngman (1991, pp. 393-4). 
49This comment seems also to apply to the papers in Gillis (1989), Boskin and McLure (1990), Eden 
(1991), Thirsk (1997), Martinez-Vazquez and Alm (2003), although Whalley (1990) does mention that one 
impetus for corporate rate reduction in Canada was the fear that debt financing, and thus interest 
deductions, would shift from the US to Canada due to the rate reductions in the US resulting from the 1986 
tax reform act.  Of course, this does not imply manipulation of transfer prices. 
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and evasion were not as well developed or as fully exploited as now.50  Fourth, it is likely 
that some of those who undertook tax reform missions, often economists trained in a 
closed-economy tradition, simply failed to realize the potential importance of transfer 
pricing.51. 
                                                 
50There is another reason for the failure to consider transfer pricing in McLure et al. (1990).  The explicit 
assignment was relatively narrow: to consider the need for inflation adjustment in the measurement of 
income. 
51Thus, in McLure (1991, p. 73), I observed, “[T]he Shoup mission generally appears to have taken the tax 
system at face value, without stressing that ‘things ain’t what they seem’ once the lawyers and accountants 
finish their work.  Though the Shoup mission mentioned the difficulties of transfer prices, it did not stress 
this problem....” 
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